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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
Chad Flanders *
Abstract
Graham v. Florida was a watershed decision, not least because of the
centrality of the so-called “rehabilitative ideal” to its holding that life in
prison for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes was cruel and
unusual. The Court’s emphasis on rehabilitation was surprising both in
terms of the Court’s previous decisions on punishment, in which
rehabilitation was barely included as a “purpose of punishment,” but also
in terms of the history of academic and legislative skepticism if not hostility
toward the idea of rehabilitation (which includes two recently decided
sentencing cases, Tapia and Pepper). Courts and commentators have
struggled to make sense of both the meaning and the scope of Graham’s
rehabilitative holding. Their struggle is one about defining how (and
whether) rehabilitation should play any substantial role in sentencing.
My essay places Graham in the context of the recent history of
rehabilitation, and views its attempt to “rehabilitate” rehabilitation in light
of that history. The rehabilitative ideal encompasses not just one model,
but three: the mostly discredited model of rehabilitation as treatment, a
more modest model of rehabilitation as training, and an older model of
rehabilitation as reform. Both the language and the result of Graham show
it to be squarely in the tradition of the third model, where rehabilitation is
not something the state provides, but something the offender is supposed to
undergo, through a process of reflection, remorse, and atonement.
Rehabilitation as reform is notable because it is compatible with a
suspicion that prison in general is a bad place for rehabilitation and that it
is unlikely that the state can do anything to positively aid the offender in
reforming. At best, the state must get out of the way. Whether we want to
extend Graham or reject it depends on whether we find its ideal of
rehabilitation as reform appealing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Graham v. Florida, 1 the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision finding a
life without parole sentence for a non-homicide crime committed by a
juvenile “cruel and unusual” has rightly been recognized as a “watershed.” 2
A major focus of the extensive commentary on the case has been on its
application of the “evolving standards of decency” test to a punishment
outside of the death penalty, and to whether Graham might apply also to
adults. 3 Equally important in Graham, but subject to much less critical
1

560 U.S. 48 (2010).
E.g., Richard A Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole 160 PENN L. REV. 1745, 1746
(2012) (noting commentators hailed Graham as a “watershed”); Id. at n. 2 (collecting
articles calling Graham a “landmark”).
3
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In, 23 FED.
SENT. REP. 79-80 (2010) (“Does Graham invite reconsideration of the Court’s
extraordinary defenses embodied in its proportionality review of all noncapital sanctions,
including term-of-years sentences short of life imprisonment [?] ….Does Graham provide
greater protection to adults as well as juveniles”?); Rachel Barkow, Categorizing Graham
23 FED. SENT. REP. 49 (2010) (asking how whether and how far the Court will extend
Graham to non-capital cases); Eva S. Nilson, From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Kennedy
Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment 23 FED. SENT. REP. 67 (2010) (discussing
what Graham might mean for the future of proportionality analysis and individualized
sentencing).
Other commentators have speculated on whether Graham means the Court is
abandoning some or all of its “evolving standards of decency” test. See Youngjae Lee, The
2
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attention, is the central role that the rehabilitative theory of punishment
plays in its holding both as a matter of rhetoric and as a matter of substance.
A sentence to imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Graham,
the Court explained, would foreswear “altogether the rehabilitative ideal,”
which was unacceptable. 4 “Life without the possibility of parole,” Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court, “gives no chance for fulfillment outside
prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.” 5 “This,”
he concluded, “the Eighth Amendment does not permit” at least when
dealing with those under the age of eighteen. 6 The state must give
“defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity for release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 7
What is rehabilitation, and what does it mean to have it as an ideal?
Francis Allen in his major work on the subject, The Decline of the
Rehabilitative Ideal (from which Justice Kennedy consciously or
unconsciously borrowed the phrase 8) noted that rehabilitation was an
inherently complex term, filled with ambiguities. 9 Moreover, as the title to
Allen books reveals, rehabilitation was, as early as the 1970s, being
abandoned as primary justification for punishment and viewed with
skepticism as any part of the justification for punishment. 10 Kennedy’s use
of rehabilitation was not merely surprising in the context of a Supreme
Court opinion, where more attention is usually paid to retributive and

Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 58 (2010); John Stinneford, Evolving
Away from Evolving Standards of Decency 23 FED. SENT. REP. 87 (2010); Ian T. Farrell,
Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 302 (2013).
4
Graham, at 74.
5
Id. at 79.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 75.
8
The first use seems to be in Francis Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226, 230 (1959); see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN,
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964) and ALLEN, infra note 9; see also
Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Idea: The View from Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1968).
9
FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981) (hereinafter
ALLEN, DECLINE) (“The rehabilitative ideal concept requires description and application. It
is not surprising to discover that the phrase embraces great complexity and, indeed,
encompasses widely different and even conflicting kinds of social policies.”); id at 52
(“Ambiguities afflict the very notion of what rehabilitation consists.”). See more recently,
United States v. Williams, 793 F.3d 1065-1066 (2d Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“[C]ritically the
defendant misses the ambiguity in the term “rehabilitation” [more precisely, “correctional
rehabilitation”] as used in discussions of criminal punishment.”).
10
ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 7, at 5-7 (explaining the nearly “unchallenged sway of the
rehabilitative ideal” in the mid-twentieth century). Cp FRANCIS T. CULLEN, REAFFIRMING
REHABILIATION (2d., 2012).
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deterrent theories; 11 it was surprising in the context of punishment theory
and practice more generally. 12 The punishment literature and the literature
on Graham has not yet come to grips the full implication of the Graham
decision because it has incompletely understood the meanings of
“rehabilitation.” 13
My paper gives an overview of the Supreme Court’s engagement
with the “rehabilitative ideal” in Graham as well as two other recent cases.
In the first part, I sketch three broad models of that ideal: rehabilitation as
treatment, rehabilitation as training, and rehabilitation as reform. The first
(“rehabilitation as treatment”) is, in its most familiar variant, the most
ambitious. It suggests nothing less than a complete overhaul of both the
theory and practice of criminal justice by redefining crime as a “sickness”
and punishment as a “cure.” 14 It is this version that has suffered the greatest
decline over the past half century even though it did (at one point) strongly
influence Supreme Court doctrine. 15 The second model, rehabilitation as
training, is less ambitious, and for perhaps that reason, has endured as a part
of sentencing. 16 It too, however, has been the object of vigorous critique.
The third model, rehabilitation as reform, has been prominent in
philosophical discussions of punishment and less on display in legal
doctrine and practice. 17 But it is this model, however, that may best explain
the use of rehabilitative theory in Graham. 18
The second and third parts of my essay move from rehabilitative
theory to legal practice. In two cases decided in the same year (2011),
United States v. Tapia 19 and United States v. Pepper, 20 the Supreme Court
has considered the use of rehabilitation in sentencing under the Sentencing

11

See e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (mentioning rehabilitation
only in passing, and dismissively).
12
Casebooks and treatises by and large treat rehabilitation as at best a failure in practice
and at worst a failed ideal. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN GARVEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 37 (6th ed., 2012) (“The conventional wisdom is that past
efforts to rehabilitate convicted offenders were mostly unsuccessful.”); Id at 38 (“Even
assuming that rehabilitative measures work, can you think of any moral objection to
rehabilitation as a justification for imposing punishment?”).
13
For early efforts to grasp the meaning of Graham which I am indebted to, see Alice
Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75 (2010); Cara
H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012).
14
See infra Part II.A
15
See e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
16
See infra Part II.B.
17
See infra Part II.C
18
See infra Part IV.C
19
131 S.Ct. 2382 (2011).
20
131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).
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Reform Act. 21 The cases point in superficially opposite directions (Tapia
opposes rehabilitation as a factor to be used in extending a prison term; 22
Pepper allows consideration of rehabilitation in resentencing 23) but both
testify to Court’s wrestling with the role (both positive and negative)
rehabilitation should have in sentencing. These cases are important, but
have been almost universally ignored in the literature on sentencing. 24
Ultimately, they are testament to the prevailing anti-rehabilitative trend in
both legislative and judicial fora.
The third part of the essay is devoted almost wholly to Graham, the
first Supreme Court case in decades to rely heavily on rehabilitative theory
in its reasoning. It is no exaggeration to say that without depending on
rehabilitation, the Court could not have concluded the way it did in
Graham. Rehabilitation is the key to the Graham opinion. But Justice
Kennedy’s opinion is frustratingly unclear as to what he means by
rehabilitation or the rehabilitative ideal. 25 While some elements of
Kennedy’s opinion imply rehabilitation as treatment, and his concern that
juveniles in prison have access to vocational and education programs
suggests rehabilitation as training, the best interpretation of rehabilitation in
Graham is as a case that treats rehabilitation as a kind of moral reform.
Understanding better what kind of rehabilitation Kennedy was after in
Graham helps us better understand how to apply Graham in future cases as
well as showing us the limitations of that decision. Graham’s model of
rehabilitation as reform is in many ways a conservative vision (in several
senses of that word) but not one without potential to change sentencing in
ways small and large. 26
II. THREE MODELS OF REHABILITATION
Rehabilitation has a long history as a part of punishment theory but
my purpose here is not to recount that history. Others have done it ably,
charting rehabilitation’s rise in the mid-twentieth century and its rapid

21

Tapia, at 2390; Pepper, at 1247.
See Tapia, at 2391 (“Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or
lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”).
23
See Pepper, at 1241 (“[A] district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s
rehabilitation since his prior sentencing.”).
24
The main exception is Professor Paul Berman’s posts on Sentencing Law and Policy.
See, e.g., The Interesting Issues Raised by Tapia, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Dec. 10,
2010); Pepper Providing a Bit of Spice to SCOTUS Sentencing Docket, SENTENCING LAW
& POLICY (Aug. 26, 2010).
25
See Part III, infra.
26
See infra Part IV.C
22
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decline into near irrelevance. 27 Early rehabilitationists had high hopes that
punishment and prison could change into something different than they
were, but those hopes swiftly came crashing down: empiricists questioned
whether rehabilitation could ever work (offenders sent to prison seemed not
to benefit from vocational and educational programs: when released from
prison, they fell back into a life of crime); theorists attacked what it saw as
rehabilitation’s unappealing presuppositions (that prisoners were not evil,
but merely “sick” and needed to be held indefinitely so they could be
“cured” by the state). By the 1980s, if not sooner, many were wondering
how we could have ever thought prison could be a place for rehabilitation
rather than purely a place for suffering and punishment. In broad outline,
the shape of the story should be familiar and parts of the history will
inevitably creep into my analysis.
What I want to do here is to isolate three models of the rehabilitative
ideal which have had particular influence over the last hundred or so years
in America law. In order to understand why the rehabilitative ideal was in
decline, we need to be straight that the rehabilitative ideal was not a single
thing; it was plural. Moreover, some of the rehabilitative models were more
modest than others and each model came in different varieties as well,
which also ran from the modest to the ambitious. The models are not
completely discrete, of course, and at points they can blend into one
another. Indeed, in some respects, the models are not mutually exclusive.
Nonetheless, I believe they are separate enough to be called separate
“models” because in rough outline they have distinguishing features and
characteristics. I start with the model that, in the minds of many, was
almost thoroughly discredited in theory and which never really took hold in
practice. At the same time, traces of its influence continue to this day. 28

27

See generally, ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 7; KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (hereinafter STITH,
FEAR), ch. 1 (“Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective”); Douglas Berman,
Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 387 (2006); Meghan Ryan, Science and the
New Rehabilitation, 5-16 (unpublished manuscript, Aug. 8, 2012); Michael Vitiello,
Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1011 (1991).
A very brief version of the story figures importantly in Justice Roberts’ dissent in
Miller. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012). (“In this case, there is little doubt
about the direction of society's evolution: For most of the 20th century, American
sentencing practices emphasized rehabilitation of the offender and the availability of
parole. But by the 1980's, outcry against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the
rehabilitative model, and other factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the
possibility of parole, imposing longer sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent
them from committing more crimes.”)
28
See infra Part III.B (discussion of Pepper and its relation to certain tenets of
rehabilitation as treatment).
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A. Rehabilitation as Treatment
At its most extreme, the rehabilitative ideal was not merely to
supplement or revise punishment, it was to replace punishment. “Crime”
and “punishment” were crude, primitive ideas 29 and had “no place in the
scientific vocabulary.” 30 The more humane and enlightened perspective
was to treat crime as an illness that needed to be treated. Jailers and judges
were out; doctors and therapists were in. 31 They had the necessary
expertise to guide a person away from his criminal, antisocial behavior and
to reenter society: they could diagnosis the causes of the illness and
recommend a course of action. 32 “The management of such [penal]
institutions much be scientific,” one rehabilitation as treatment theorist
wrote “and the care of their inmates must be scientific, since a grave crime
is always a manifestation of the pathological condition of the individual.” 33
On the therapeutic version of rehabilitation, crime was a most of all
a signal to the criminological “experts” that a person needed not
punishment, but treatment. – in the way that a rash or a cold might be a
signal to doctors that care was needed. 34 How much treatment, and for how
long, was up to the expert. When treatment was completed, he “prisoner,
like the doctor’s other patients, should emerge … a different person,
differently equipped, differently functioning, and headed in a different
direction from when he began the treatment.” 35 At the limit, if the offender
could not successfully reenter society, experts would be able to treat him in
a clinical setting to allow him a comfortable and protective (if forever
confined) existence.
29

Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed.
1971) at 248; see also id. at 245.
30
Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment 47 in PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH
PENALTY, THE CURRENT DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuard E. Rosenbaum, eds., 1995).
31
See President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 163 (USGSPO 1967) (analogizing criminal offenders
to patients).
32
See, e.g., Henry Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 259 (For the rehabilitative ideal, “Human
behavior is the product of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified, and it is the
function of the scientists to discover and describe them. Knowledge of the antecedents of
human behavior is essential for scientific control of that behavior.”); Herbert Morris,
Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 82
(discussing rehabilitation as treatment).
33
Enrico Ferri, The Positive School of Criminology, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely
E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 236.
34
Menninger, Love Against Hate, supra note 25, at 246 (“I would say that according to the
prevalent understanding of the words, crime is not a disease. Neither is it an illness,
although I think it should be! It should be treated, and it could be, but mostly isn’t”).
35
Id. at 246-47.
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The therapeutic ideal of rehabilitation seemed to many to be naively
optimistic in its assumptions: that the causes of crime could be diagnosed,
that a cure can be administered, and that we could do away with
“punitiveness” of punishment. 36 We are much less sanguine now. 37 But
philosophers and policy-makers responding to rehabilitation as treatment at
the time (and they were legion) saw something much more sinister; they did
not object to rehabilitation as treatment as impractical. They rejected the
ideal of rehabilitation as treatment altogether qua ideal. 38 They saw a
worldview that treated human beings less as agents as more as patients who
could be hospitalized or imprisoned and “treated” indefinitely not for the
safety of society, but supposedly “for their own good.”
In addition, there was something dehumanizing about being told that
your crime was not a free act but instead a sickness. Not only was this
factually incorrect (criminals had not “come down” with anything 39), it was
dangerous. Novels such as Clockwork Orange and One Flew Over the
Cuckoo’s Nest described the frightful implications of a society run by
experts where one’s freedom depending on convincing doctors and nurses
that you had been successfully “cured.” 40 There was something simpler and
clearer, if not more ennobling, about saying that one was being punished
because one deserved it (it was a matter of justice) or that society needed to
lock you up to protect itself. 41 These theories did not carry with them the
implication that you were somehow diseased or sick and in need of a
doctor’s care. They treated you as a person: rehabilitation as treatment, by
contrast, was “not a response to a person who is at fault. We respond to an
individual, not because of what he has done, but become of some condition
36

See, e.g., Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The instant controversy
arises out of the recent tendency to reject the so-called ‘rehabilitative ideal’ as a relic of an
earlier, more optimistic, era and to return to traditional criteria of retribution and deterrence
in punishing juvenile offenders.”).
37
See the analysis of the optimism of early rehabilitative theories in ALLEN, DECLINE,
supra note 7, ch. 1.
38
For powerful philosophical criticism about the assumptions and prescriptions of
rehabilitation as treatment, see, inter alia, Richard Wasserstrom, Punishment v.
Rehabiliation 51 in PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY, THE CURRENT
DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuard E. Rosenbaum, eds., 1995); C.S. Lewis, The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed.
1971) at 301; Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in id. at 76.
39
E.g., MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 40 (1973)
(“Many convicted criminals … are not driven by, or ‘acting out,’ neurotic or psychotic
impulses. Instead, they have coldly and deliberately figured the odds …”).
40
See generally ANTHONY BURGESS, CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); KEN KESEY, ONE
FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST (1962). For a more philosophical version of this worry,
see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH (1975).
41
Lewis, supra note 34, at 307-308.
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from which he is suffering.” 42
However aggressively rehabilitation as treatment was attacked in
theory (and it seems clear that in the minds of most people that it has been
thoroughly defeated), it left its mark on Supreme Court doctrine. In the
1949 case Williams v. New York, the Supreme Court not only agreed with
but seemed to embrace the idea that punishment had to be tailored to the
criminal offender, or “individualized.” 43 The idea was straight from the
literature on rehabilitation as treatment: 44 the effective diagnosis is one that
treats the person and his disease; there could be no “one size fits all”
prescription, because each person’s need and propensity for rehabilitation
differed. 45 The statute at issue in the case, the Court said, “emphasize[d] a
prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime.” 46 “The belief no longer prevails,” the
Court announced, as if ringing out an older, less enlightened era “that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without
regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.” 47
Moreover, for rehabilitation as treatment, the prescription should be
made by an expert, using all the relevant information the expert could
gather, taking into consideration “not only static and presently observable
factors, but dynamic and historical factors, and factors of environmental
interaction and change.” 48 The expert would look into “the future of
correction, re-education, and prevention.” 49 For the Supreme Court, the
expert were sentencing judges and parole officers, 50 and in Williams, the
Court maintained that the judge had to have access to a full sentencing
report (including, but not limited to, information about the crime the
42

Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E.
Grupp ed. 1971) at 83.
43
Williams v. New York, 377 U.S. 241; United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). I
am indebted to Berman’s account of all these cases in the discussion that follows. Berman,
Conceptualizing Booker, supra note 24, at 388-393.
44
Henry Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 257 (“A rehabilitative approach is necessarily
an individual approach”).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 248
47
Id.
48
Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 46.
49
Id.
50
On the pure rehabilitation as treatment model, judges would eventually surrender the
sentencing role entirely to experts. Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 47; STITH, FEAR
at 17, 20. Judges with full information (e.g., what was contained in a pre-sentencing
report) were a second-best option. Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 244; Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a
Rational Penal Code in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 279.
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offender was being punished for) in order to make a suitable
recommendation as to punishment. The report would include such
information about the convicted person’s “past life, health, habits, conduct,
and mental and moral propensities.” 51
The Court underlined that the reason why the judge needed this
information was so that he could recommend a punishment that would best
serve to rehabilitate and reform him. A “strong motivating force” for
individualizing punishment, the Court wrote, “has been the belief that, by
careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders, many
could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom
and useful citizenship.” 52 In a note, the Court favorably cited a prominent
rehabilitation as treatment proponent 53 and declared in the text of the
opinion that “Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals of criminal jurisprudence.” 54 In order to serve the goals of
rehabilitation and reform, judges needed to have the freedom to range
beyond facts about the offense, in order to individually tailor sentences. 55
The Supreme Court in Williams was signing on, at least in part, to the
rehabilitation as treatment program. 56 It would reaffirm its support again
over the years. 57
The fact that Williams tied individualization in sentencing to
rehabilitative goals is important, because individualization is not
intrinsically tied to rehabilitation. Individual tailoring can be backwardlooking and retributive or forward-looking and rehabilitative. If the judge is
51

337 U.S. at 245.
Id. at 249.
53
See id. at n.13 (“It should be obvious that a proper [sentencing] . . . involves a study of
each case upon an individual basis . . . Is the criminal a man so constituted and so
habituated to war upon society that there is little or no real hope that he ever can be
anything other than a menace to society – or is he obviously amenable to reformation?”)
(quoting SHELDON GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 133 (1933)).
54
Id. at 248.
55
See also Grayson, at 46-47 (addressing need for “informed judgment” concerning
potential for rehabilitation); Greenholtz. It seems somewhat ironic that the Court in
Williams was affirming a death sentence, justified along rehabilitative lines. But it may be
that some are beyond rehabilitation, and so deserve death. It may also be that death could
induce some to reform, at least in the short time that they have left.
56
Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, supra note 24, at 389 (“In 1949, the Supreme Court
constitutionalized [the rehabilitative] approach to sentencing in Williams…”); TAMASAK
WICHARAYA, SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM ON
COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME 30 (1995) (“Penal policy in the therapeutic state was even
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court”).
57
See e.g., Grayson, 438 U.S. at 41; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 1; see generally Berman,
supra note 56, at 392 (describing later opinions in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
connection between individualization and rehabilitation).
52
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looking at details the offender (details which even may be beyond the crime
he was convicted of) about to find out what he deserves as his punishment,
then the judge’s individualizing is backward-looking: he is trying to fit the
offender to the right amount of deserved retributive punishment. The Court
has used this model in recent cases, including one involving juvenile
sentencing. 58
But if the judge is using those same details to determine how much
rehabilitation the offender needs – as well as his fitness for rehabilitation –
the judge’s individualizing is forward looking. He is trying to fit the
offender to the right kind of “cure,” given the offender’s situation. It was
with this kind of ideal in mind that the Williams Court favorably cited
rehabilitation as a goal of punishment. It is evident, too, in the Court’s
emphasis on the judge not just finding a just punishment, but also an
“enlightened one,” and why the judge needed information that went beyond
the information supplied by the guilty verdict. 59
Individual tailoring for rehabilitation lies somewhere on a
continuum between individualization for retribution (individualization that
is backward looking) and the rehabilitation as treatment model’s ideal,
which is fully indefinite sentences and not merely indeterminate ones. 60 On
the rehabilitation as treatment model, it is not enough to simply make a
prospective judgment about someone’s ability to be cured, but an ongoing
one. No, the sentence must be continually reevaluated, and “the convicted
offender would be detained indefinitely pending a decision as to whether
and how and when to reintroduce him successfully into society.” 61 Those
who are cured can be released; for those who do not respond to treatment,
we must provide for their “indefinitely continued confinement.” 62 The
experts in the rehabilitation as treatment model could not be chained to any
guidelines or other limitations as to how long sentences could be.

58

See infra Part IV.C at note 162.
Id. at 390-91.
60
By indefinite sentencing, I mean to indicate an in principle indefinite sentence; an
indeterminate sentence can be confined within a specific range, or be subject to a
maximum. See Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 291; United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,
165 (1997) (Stevens J., dissenting) (Williams was a case that dealt with “the exercise of the
sentencing judge’s discretion within the range authorized by law, rather than with rules
defining the range within which discretion may be exercised.”).
61
Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 44; Ferri, The Positive School, supra note 29, at
236 (“We maintain that congenital or pathological criminals cannot be locked up for a
definite term in any institution, but should remain there until they are adapted for the
normal life of society.”).
62
Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 45.
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B. Rehabilitation as Training

Rehabilitation as treatment wanted a paradigm shift in how we
thought of crime and punishment, a shift that the Supreme Court at least
partially endorsed in Williams and its progeny. 63 At the limit, the shift led
some to wonder whether rehabilitation as treatment was a theory of
punishment at all, and instead was a theory of what to put in place of
punishment. 64 But rehabilitation has over the years also taken on a more
hum-drum connotation, which is far from the radical ambitious of
rehabilitation as treatment. What I will call “rehabilitation as training”
emphasized not a cure for crime, but rather piecemeal efforts at the
betterment of inmates through vocational training and education or by drug
treatment. The goal was not that the inmate be totally healed of his
criminological tendencies (whatever that would mean) but that he become
more fit to reenter society as a productive and contributing member. He
would be prepared to find a job upon release, or be able to enter and
maintain a stable relationship, or simply be more equipped to cope with
day-to-day life. For juvenile offenders, such programs could include “trade
training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and
recreational programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and]
agriculture and stock raising.” 65
Sentences on the rehabilitation as training view would (like those
made according to the rehabilitation as treatment view) still would need to
be individualized, to an extent. We would need to discover what training
programs would be appropriate for the offender, and this required having a
particularized knowledge of his background and his capacities. The
rehabilitation as training model, in short, kept the focus on individualized
punishment for the benefit of the offender but shifted the form of
rehabilitation from therapy and treatment to training. The training might be
expected to make the defendant a productive member of society, or at least
get him to stop committing crimes (or, preferably both). 66 It did not involve
63

See infra I.B.
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed., 2010) (“It is perhaps not entirely correct to call
this treatment ‘‘punishment,’’ as the emphasis is away from making him suffer and in the
direction of making his life better and more pleasant.”).
65
United States v. Won Cho, 730 F.2d 1260, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1984) (“In enacting the
Youth Corrections Act of 1950, Congress envisioned a rehabilitative program that included
‘trade training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and recreational
programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and] agriculture and stock raising.’”)
(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 3983, 3987).
66
United States v. Williams, 793 F.3d at 1065-1066 (Rehabilitation “often has rather
utopian overtones—easing the defendant's transition to community life, making him a
64
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treating him as a patient in any sustained way: even the person in drug
treatment was not “sick,” but just needed help getting off his feet. 67
Nearly all versions of rehabilitation as training had their wings
clipped in the second half of the twentieth Century. In a hugely influential
essay, 68 Robert Martinson surveyed over 200 studies regarding the effects
of various training programs in prison. What he found was that, in the
phrase that was to become famous “nothing worked”: no training program
seemed to be effective in decreasing recidivism rates. 69 “With few and
isolated exceptions,” Martinson wrote, “the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.” 70 If the
goal of training was to get inmates to be able to deal successfully in the real
world, then the failure to prevent recidivism was a serious indictment of
rehabilitation as training. It meant that time in training programs was doing
nothing to curb the behavior that got offenders in trouble in the first place.
Prison with rehabilitation thrown in was not making anyone better and
prison might have even been making them worse. 71
The model of rehabilitation as training subsequently became even
more modest. It did not hold out the purpose of punishment was training, as
in: we send people to prison so that they can enroll in vocational and
educational training. Instead, it became the idea that if offenders were
going to be in prison anyway, then it could not hurt to also give them
training. It might not help, either, but it was an acceptable alternative to
doing nothing. The purpose of punishment may not be rehabilitation (as the
rehabilitation as treatment people believed, and as some of the more
productive, law-abiding member of society. … A more modest conception of rehabilitation,
however, is that a defendant is rehabilitated when he ceases committing crimes, at least
crimes of the gravity of the crime for which he was convicted, whether or not he becomes a
productive member of society.”).
67
An assumption that provides the background for the Tapia decision. See infra Part III.B.
See also Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (rejecting idea of alcoholism as a “disease”).
68
There is considerable debate over whether the influence of this essay is justified, and
whether the essay truly did conclude what people said it did; that it did have an influence,
and that influence contributed to the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, is nearly undisputed.
69
See also ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 7, at 57.
70
Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB.
INT. 22, 25 (Spring 1973) (emphasis omitted).
71
But see United States v. Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The conclusions of
those who have critically examined programs implemented during the rise of the era of the
‘rehabilitative ideal’ with regard to their efficacy in reducing recidivism and tendency to be
used to justify substantial encroachments on liberty should be carefully considered in our
rethinking of the intended goals of our system of criminal justice. Although one cannot
help but be disillusioned by such failures, it is important not to give up all hope. These
failures may be attributable, at least in part, to the dearth of resources committed to making
rehabilitative programs in institutions work, and the often haphazard manner by which such
programs are implemented.”).
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optimistic rehabilitation as training advocates proposed), but it could be a
place where some rehabilitation might occur. The fact that rehabilitation
doesn’t work all that well shouldn’t be a deterrent to having rehabilitation at
all. As the Court put it in Greenholtz, “The fact that anticipations and hopes
for rehabilitation programs have fallen far short of expectations of a
generation ago need not lead states to abandon hopes for those
objectives.” 72 Maybe rehabilitation programs worked, even if they didn’t
work “spectacularly.” 73
In his classic opinion in Bergman v. United States, Judge Marvin
Frankel gave clear form to the emerging wisdom about rehabilitation as
training. “[T]his Court,” Frankel wrote, “shares the growing understanding
that no one should ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation.”74 Nonetheless,
“[i]f someone must be imprisoned – for other, valid reasons – we should
seek to make rehabilitative resources available to him or her.” 75
Rehabilitation could remain a goal and a resource for those already in
prison, but it could no longer be the goal of punishment, 76 a position that
would later became codified. 77
C. Rehabilitation as Moral Reform
There is a third model of rehabilitation that is important to point out,
and its ambitions lie somewhere in between rehabilitation as treatment and
rehabilitation as training. Rehabilitation as reform, as I shall call it, can be
helpfully compared and contrasted with rehabilitation as treatment. Like
rehabilitation as treatment, rehabilitation as reform emphasizes not just
making the offender a fitter, more productive member of society, but in
fundamentally changing him. Unlike rehabilitation as treatment, however,
this change is not along the lines of a medical paradigm where the offender
is sick and needs to be cured. Rather, the offender needs moral education:
he needs to learn that what he has done was wrong, and to (at least) feel
72

442 U.S., at 13.
See JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 500 (7th ed. 2006).
74
United States v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y.1976).
75
Id.
76
See id. (“[T]he goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the
sentence to confinement.”). See also Greenholtz, at 13-14 (“The objective of rehabilitating
convicted persons to be useful, law-abiding members of society can remain a goal no
matter how disappointing the progress. But it will not contribute to these desirable
objectives to invite or encourage a continuing state of adversary relations between society
and the inmate.”).
77
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”).
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remorse over it. The offender is not supposed just to “fit in,” he is supposed
to become almost a different person, a “reformed” person through a process
of moral reflection. The idea of rehabilitation as reform has not figured
much in recent jurisprudence (the exception to this, I will argue, is Graham)
although it has recently enjoyed a renewed vogue in moral and political
theory. 78
The idea of rehabilitation as moral reform is in fact a very old idea,
if not the oldest, association between punishment and rehabilitation. 79 It is
at least as old as the penitentiary, where convicts were meant to go and, in
solitude, reflect on their wrongs and show penance for them. 80 We punish
with the hope that this will induce the offender to reform; but punishment is
only the necessary condition for this moral reform, it is not a sufficient one.
In the phrasing of Walter Moberly, rehabilitation as reform is not about
reform while punishment, but reform by punishing. “Many thinkers who
speak of the State’s duty to reform by punishing really mean a duty to
reform as well as to punish. … But such improvement is not due to the
penal aspects of prison life. On the contrary, it is achieved in spite of them,
if at all.” 81 Rehabilitation as training might view rehabilitation as
something that goes on during punishment, but this is not the vision of
rehabilitation as reform. Reform is supposed to come about by being
punished. “Only the latter idea,” writes Hastings Rashdall, “should be
thought as accepting reform as a goal of punishment.” 82
It is not obvious how this reform was supposed to happen. Perhaps
being punished was enough to induce in the offender feelings of remorse
78

For good recent statements see Zachary Hoskins, Punishment, Contempt, and the
Prospect of Moral Reform, CRIM. J. ETHICS (March 2013); Steven Sverdlik, Punishment
and Reform (2012), available at
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_philosophy_research/1. See also WALTER
MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT (1968); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 208 (1984) and ANTONY DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic
Theory of Punishment in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).
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It arguably is present in Plato. Plato, Punishment as Cure, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrud Ezorsky ed. 1977) at 37; J.E. McTaggart, Hegel’s
Theory of Punishment in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrud Ezorsky
ed. 1977) at 40.
80
See the discussion by Stith and Cabranes of the “civic ideal of reformation through
punishment” in STITH, FEAR at 15 (“Associated most prominently with the Pennsylvania
Quaker physician Benjamin Rush and his friend Benjamin Franklin, the ideal of personal
reformation was at the heart of the movement to transform existing penal institutions into
more humane institutions of treatment and reform.”); see also DAVID ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
81
WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 123 (1968).
82
HASTINGS RASHDALL, 1 THE THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL 292 (1924).
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and repentance. 83 Perhaps it was through being isolated from outside,
corrupting influences. 84 Or perhaps it was a little of both. As de Beaumont
and de Toqeuveville explained in their survey of American prisons:
Thrown into solitude [the prisoner] reflects. Placed alone, in view
of this crime, he learns to hate it; and if his soul be not yet surfeited
with crime, and thus have lost all taste for anything better, it is in
solitude, where remorse will come to assail him. … Can there be a
combination more powerful for reform than that of a prison which
hands over the prisoner to all the trials of solitude, leads him through
reflection to remorse, through religion to hope? 85
For rehabilitation as reform, other people (judges, jailors) cannot
themselves directly cause moral reform. Doctors and experts cannot do it,
nor can vocational counselors or psychologists, although perhaps they can
help at the margins. Training may be a good way to show you have
reformed, but it is possible to be well-trained but not morally reformed.
You could be an excellent worker or student, but a bad person. Only your
own efforts, the hard work of reflection, can lead you to remorse,
repentance, and hope.
The model of rehabilitation as reform in its expectation of what the
prisoner was supposed to achieve rivals rehabilitation as treatment in its
ambition. Your time in prison was meant to cure you, not in the sense that
you were sick and now you are well, but in the sense that you were morally
corrupt and now you are morally pure (or more pure). In some more
aggressive versions, the very purpose of punishment is that it can induce
this reform: we punish you so that you will reform yourself. In a less
ambitious version, rehabilitation as moral reform requires that prison should
not hinder the goal of moral reform (where punishment might be justified
on other grounds). 86 At minimum, prison could not be a place where you
came out brutalized and degraded. 87
In either its more or less ambitious versions, however, the goal of
moral reform is fundamentally incompatible with rehabilitation as
treatment. The therapeutic model dispenses with remorse and regret (do we
feel guilty for having a cold or for having gout?) and places the prisoner in
83
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the hands of a doctor. Moral reform, by contrast, requires that the offender
accept his responsibility and to strive to atone for it; he undergoes a kind of
“secular penance.” 88 In this respect, moral reform is often tied to
retributivism, but it is, I believe, distinct from it. Retribution at its core says
that people deserve to be punished. 89 It says nothing about whether those
who are punished believe that they are responsible or that they should show
remorse for what they have done. 90 Moral reform, by contrast, requires
these things, and indeed may require that punishment should cease after
moral reform has been achieved. 91
III. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE I: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
I have already mentioned how rehabilitation in some of its guises
has appeared in older federal and Supreme Court cases. But discussions
about the meaning of rehabilitation have played a significant role in two
recent cases besides Graham, although the focus in these cases was on the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) and its interpretation and use of
rehabilitation. 92 Nonetheless, in Tapia v. United States and United States v.
Pepper (both decided in 2012), the Supreme Court made more general,
almost philosophical, statements about the meaning of rehabilitation.
Interestingly, the statements in the two cases seem to directly be at odds
with one another (Tapia seems anti- the rehabilitative ideal; Pepper pro-).
Whether the competing statements can be reconciled in terms of a larger
principle is the focus of the last section of this part.
The two cases also form an important backdrop for my reading of
Graham despite the fact that they were decided after Graham. Indeed, they
form a bridge between the history of the rehabilitative ideal and its present
realty. Parts of that ideal continue to be in play in the Court’s
88

R.A. Duff, Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community in WHY PUNISH? HOW
MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).
89
E.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1991).
90
Characterizing punishment is a “reformative enterprise,” Duff, supra note 89 at 179,
seems fundamentally different than viewing it as a way of giving out “just deserts.” At
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who deserve it.
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Contra Duff, supra note 67. It may be thought that so-called shaming punishments
might induce a type of moral reform; I am not sure this is correct. At least, it is an open
question whether shaming serves more to degrade the offender than to inspire him to
reform himself. It is. however, also an open question whether prison is all in all less
degrading than shaming punishments. For my reflections on this, see Flanders, Shame and
the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609 (2006).
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For background on the SRA, see STITH, FEAR, ch. 2 (“The Invention of the Sentencing
Guidelines”).

18

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILIATIVE IDEAL

jurisprudence, but mostly the Court is acting against a background of
pronounced hostility to rehabilitation: a hostility that was codified in the
SRA, but that the Court also seems to share. How Graham could
emphasize the ideal of rehabilitation in this context is addressed in the next
Part.
A. The Rejection of Rehabilitation: Tapia
Tapia concerned the sentencing of Alexander Tapia, who was
convicted by a jury for being an illegal immigrant into the United States for
financial gain. 93 At sentencing, the judge gave Tapia 51 months in prison,
but was ambiguous as to the reasons why she was being sentenced to that
particular term. According to the sentencing judge, the sentence for Tapia
had “to be sufficient to provided needed correctional treatment, and here I
think the needed correction treatment is the 500 Drug Program.” The judge
went on: “Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am going to
impose a 51-month sentence ... and one of the factors that affects this is the
need to provide treatment. In other words so she is in long enough to get
the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.” 94 In other words, the sentencing
judge seemed to be indicating that one of the main reasons (if not the main
reason) that Tapia was being given 51 months was so that she would be
eligible for drug treatment. 95 If drug treatment had not been possible, or not
available, Tapia would have gotten a lesser sentence. The Court found that
the trial judge had erred in extending Tapia’s sentence in order that she be
able to receive drug treatment, and remanded her case to the 9th Circuit to
determine whether Tapia’s failure to object to her punishment at sentencing
meant she was without any remedy.
Read narrowly, Tapia is an opinion about statutory construction, in
particular whether Section 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act made a
punishment that was imposed, in part or in whole, for the sake of a
prisoner’s rehabilitation permissible. That section, in relevant part,
provided that the court, “in determining whether to impose a term of
imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in
determining the length of the term” should recognize that “imprisonment is
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” 96
Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, interpreted this to mean that a
sentencing judge could not impose or increase a convicted person’s
93

Tapia, at 2383.
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sentence in order to advance the goal of rehabilitation. Much like Judge
Frankel’s position in the Bergman case, the Sentencing Reform Act allowed
consideration of rehabilitation once a punishment of imprisonment had been
determined on other grounds, but not in the formulation of the length of
imprisonment or even whether imprisonment was appropriate. 97
Rehabilitation might be appropriate in choosing a punishment other than
imprisonment, that is, in rejecting prison as an option. 98 But it could not be
the basis of choosing imprisonment over other alternatives or (more
importantly for the Tapia case) deciding on a longer term of imprisonment.
But the Court sweeps more broadly in construing the Sentencing
Reform Act, construing it as wholly rejecting almost any except the most
modest version of the rehabilitative ideal. Again, the Court is only
interpreting a statute not giving its own independent judgment of
rehabilitation, but the emphasis on the SRA’s repudiation of rehabilitation is
instructive. Quoting from and relying on its decision in Mistretta, the Court
noted that sentencing prior to the SRA was “premised on a faith in
rehabilitation.” 99 That faith required that judges and other correctional
officers be permitted to base “their respective sentencing and release
decisions upon their own assessments of the offender’s amenability to
rehabilitation.” 100 A prisoner was to stay in prison until he had shown that
he could be safely reenter society, that is, that he had been rehabilitated.
Accordingly, release “often coincided with ‘the successful completing of
certain vocation, educational, and counseling programs within the
prisons.” 101 But this model “fell into disfavor” not only because it resulting
in sentencing disparities, but more fundamentally, because many began to
doubt that prison and prison programs could reliably rehabilitate offenders
(and that officials could tell when prisoners had been successfully
rehabilitated). 102
In other words, according to the Tapia Court, the SRA effectively
repudiated Williams, at least when it came to imprisoning offenders, and by
doing so pushed courts to move beyond rehabilitation as treatment (and its
reliance on expert judgment and indeterminate sentencing) and even
rehabilitation as training (at least on any strong version of that model).
Determinate sentencing, and not individualized sentences, was now the
97
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102
Id. at 2387.

20

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILIATIVE IDEAL

order of the day: judges were constrained in picking and choosing
punishment based on facts about the offender, and about his capacity for
rehabilitation. Rehabilitative training and treatment could go on in prison
but it could not be treated as a goal of punishment; they were things that
could occur only after an appropriate punishment had been fixed. Even
then, there was little guarantee that any “vocational, educational, and
counseling programs” within prison would be successful. If Congress
wanted courts to be able to mandate rehabilitation as training in prison, the
Court noted, it would have given them the power to impose training or drug
treatment on offenders in prison but it notably did not give them that power.
Courts can only “recommend” training and treatment for offenders who are
to be imprisoned, and Justice Kagan, in an aside, encouraged them to do
so. 103 But they cannot require it. 104
B. Pepper and the Reaffirmation of the Ideal
Surprisingly, in the same term as Tapia, the Court reaffirmed its
holding in Williams in terms that were almost as sweeping as Tapia’s
rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. Pepper v. United States involved a
unique set of facts: Jason Pepper had pled guilty to a conspiracy to
distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. 105 He was sentenced
to a 24 month term in prison, an almost 75 percent departure from the
normal sentencing range, and five years of supervised release. 106 The
Government appealed the sentence, 107 and two years after the original
sentencing decision, Pepper’s original sentence was reversed and remanded
by the Eighth Circuit for resentencing. 108 In the meantime, Pepper served
his 24 month prison term and began a period of supervised release. 109 At
his resentencing hearing in 2006, Pepper and several witnesses testified that
he had, inter alia, completed a 500 hour drug program, 110 no longer was
abusing drugs, had enrolled in college (and was getting straight As), had a
part-time job, and had reconciled with his family.
The district court again sentenced Pepper to 24 months, relying on
103
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Pepper’s postsentencing rehabilitation and explaining it would not advance
“any purpose of federal sentencing policy or any other policy behind the
federal sentencing guidelines to send [Pepper] back to prison.” 111 The
government appealed and Pepper’s sentence was once more reversed and
remanded to the district court. 112 In its ruling, the Eighth Circuit explained
that the district court had abused its discretion in considering postsentencing
rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, both because it was not “relevant” and
“would create unwarranted sentencing disparities and inject blatant
inequities into the sentencing process.” 113 At Pepper’s second resentencing
hearing in 2008 (and third sentencing hearing overall), Pepper and others
again testified to Pepper’s continuing rehabilitation (he was still attending
school and still working, but also had recently married). This time, the
district court rejected Pepper’s request for a downward variance, and Pepper
was sentenced to 65 months. 114 After losing at the Court of Appeals,
Pepper appealed to the Supreme Court. 115 He won.
The Court defended the right of judges at sentencing to consider all
factors in sentencing, even evidence that was not available to the original
sentencing judge. In favoring broad discretion, the Court found its most
germane precedent in Williams, the case in which the Court had most
blatantly adopted aspects of the rehabilitative ideal. “We have
emphasized,” the Pepper Court said, quoting Williams, that “highly
relevant—if not essential—to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is
the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s life and characteristics.” 116
The language the Pepper Court quoted from Williams is the
language that the rehabilitation as treatment model bequeathed to the Court:
experts and judges need to have full information and wide latitude when
sentencing, because the idea behind sentencing is not to give a “one size fits
all punishment but to tailor or “individualize” a punishment based on the
particularities of each offender. As the Court also quoted from Williams,
“the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.” 117 The
best sentence is the right prescription based on an individualized diagnosis
that will lead to the offender’s rehabilitation. 118 Indeed, Pepper goes even
111
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further than Williams did, emphasizing the need to consider evidence of the
offender’s character not only before but even well after the moment of
conviction.
Of course, the Pepper Court did not connect individualized
punishments to the need for rehabilitation as treatment; then again, neither
did the Williams Court. But recall that rehabilitation as training also
required that sentences be individually tailored. In this regard it is revealing
what additional facts the district court in Pepper’s resentencing thought
especially relevant, viz., the fact that he was attending college, held a steady
job, that he had reconciled in his family. In short, Pepper had rehabilitated
himself, not in the sense that he was sick and getting better (the
rehabilitation as treatment model) but in the sense that he was well on his
way to becoming a fit and productive member of society (the rehabilitation
as training model).
The inference is almost impossible to miss: Pepper was getting a
lower sentence because he was getting rehabilitated outside of prison and so
would need fewer years of rehabilitation inside prison. The Pepper Court
held as much. Evidence of Pepper’s rehabilitation prior to his sentencing
was relevant because it was “highly relevant to several” of the statutorily
mandated factors judges were to consider at sentencing, including the
purpose of “provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training.” 119 Sentences should be individualized, Pepper held,
and one of the things that matters to individualization is whether the
offender needs (or in Pepper’s case, doesn’t need) rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation, in short, is a sentencing factor.
C. Reconciling Tapia and Pepper
Can the two cases – decided in the same Supreme Court term – be
reconciled? At a high enough level of abstraction, Tapia and Pepper go in
strikingly different directions. Tapia repudiates Williams; Pepper embraces
it. As far as the interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act, Tapia seems
to have the better story. Indeed, Alito picked out the majority’s reliance on
Williams in Pepper for special ridicule. “Anyone familiar with the history
of criminal sentencing in this country cannot fail to see the irony in the
Court’s praise for the sentencing scheme exemplified by Williams,” Alito
wrote. 120 But, he continued, “[b]y the time of the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, this scheme had fallen into widespread
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disrepute.” 121 He rejected the Court’s opinion in Pepper as an ill-advised
“paean” to the “old regime.” 122
More substantively, the two decisions are at odds in whether
rehabilitation is a sentencing factor. Tapia reads the SRA and particular
provisions of it as positively removing rehabilitation as a factor for judges
to consider. Pepper favors judges considering an offender’s past
rehabilitation as relevant to whether he needs further rehabilitation. Trying
to find a distinction between the two uses of rehabilitation seems
formalistic. We could say that Tapia is about using rehabilitation to
increase a sentence, whereas Pepper is about using rehabilitation to
decrease a sentence. But then both are still ways of using rehabilitation as a
sentencing factor. If prison is not an appropriate means for promoting
rehabilitation at all (as the statute at issue in Tapia suggests) then it should
not have been a relevant factor in Pepper’s case. But it seems obvious that
rehabilitation was a driving factor in at least one of Pepper’s sentencing
decisions: because Pepper was already rehabilitated, he needed less
rehabilitation in prison. If Tapia is correct about rehabilitation as a
sentencing factor, then Pepper seems wrongly decided and vice versa. 123
But there may be a way we can give more substance to the seeming
formalism. Suppose we take Tapia’s rule not to be the blanket one that
sentencing cannot be used as a factor when sentencing someone to prison;
suppose, instead, we take it to be that, because prison is bad for
rehabilitation. If prison is bad for rehabilitation, then judges should never
factor in someone’s need for rehabilitation when considering whether to
increase his term in prison. But by the same token, if prison is bad for
rehabilitation, then judges should factor in someone’s need for
rehabilitation when considering whether to decrease his term in prison (or
not to sentence him to prison at all). In short, the SRA doesn’t dictate that
judges should never consider someone’s need for rehabilitation. It dictates
that judges should consider someone’s need for rehabilitation only when it
means that they should get less time in prison. The principle that emerges
of out of the cases then is: prison is bad for rehabilitation. Under this
principle, both Tapia and Pepper were correctly decided because they both
did not use rehabilitation as a factor that might increase prison time, Tapia
121

Id. at 1256 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1257 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123
If we extend the logic of Pepper further, its tension with Tapia becomes even more
manifest Suppose Pepper had done bad things prior to his conviction (he had lost his job,
or gotten a divorce, or flunked out of school), then presumably these facts would be
relevant, but relevant because they showed the need for further rehabilitation. If Pepper’s
good acts are relevant to decreasing his sentence because he has already been rehabilitated,
then his bad acts would seem to be relevant for the same reason: because they show the
need for more rehabilitation.
122
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because it rejected a longer sentence and Pepper because it licensed a lower
sentence.
Viewed in this light, Pepper is as anti-rehabilitative as Tapia. Both
opinions are aware that rehabilitation programs are available in prison. But
such programs are only relevant, if they are relevant at all, if prison time is
going to be imposed anyway. If punishment is to be imposed, it is probably
a good thing to commend them. The model at play here is mostly
rehabilitation as training but in the modest way Judge Frankel endorsed
it. 124 Judges should be aware that rehabilitative programs are there for
prisoners, just don’t operate under the idea that prison is being imposed for
rehabilitation -- whether by itself or in conjunction with educational,
vocational, or treatment programs. At best, rehabilitation is something that
should be pursued outside of prison (including while supervised by the
criminal justice system), but never in prison. 125
IV. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE II: THE CONSTITUTION
Graham was a Constitutional decision and not a statutory one, and it
was decided before both Tapia or Pepper. Nonetheless, its emphasis on
rehabilitation is striking. Both Tapia and Pepper show an awareness of the
doubt about rehabilitation that resulted in Congress passing the SRA, an
awareness that predates those cases. 126 And when set against other
constitutional cases discussing punishment, Graham’s focus on
rehabilitation is an outlier. In Roper, the case that prior to Graham and
which Graham most closely resembles, the focus was on retribution and
deterrence, and whether the death penalty was a proportional punishment
for children who are found guilty of murder. 127 It barely mentioned
rehabilitation, which given Graham, seems odd. Death forecloses
rehabilitation at least as much life without parole does (if not more). 128
124

For a reading of Tapia along these lines see William Peacock, Prison is for Punishment,
Not Rehabilitation? FINDLAW:: U.S. FOURTH CIRCUIT (Oct. 31, 2012) at
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2012/10/prison-is-for-punishment-notrehabilitation.html.
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Thanks to Eric Miller for helping me to see this point more clearly.
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See Mistretta v. United States 488 U.S. 361 at 366 (“Serious disparities in sentences,
however, were common. Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be
questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most cases.
See N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 24-43 (1974); F. Allen, The Decline of the
Rehabilitative Ideal (1981).”).
127
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
128
Although cf. Meghan Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231
(2013) (death sentence not incompatible with rehabilitation); Chad Flanders, The Case
Against the Case Against the Death Penalty, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595 (2013) (same).
Perhaps the Court thought it went without saying that death cannot rehabilitate. But in

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILIATIVE IDEAL

25

Why was rehabilitation so important in Graham, and equally as important,
what did Graham mean by rehabilitation?
A. Graham’s Rehabilitative Holding
The early response to Graham understandably focused on its
extension of the “evolving standards of decency” test beyond the death
penalty to sentences to life without parole. 129 Whether the Court’s
reasoning will be extended to other sentences and other groups (besides
juveniles) still remains to be seen, and is the focus of much good work in
the area. 130 But Graham’s more lasting impact may be its renewed
emphasis on rehabilitation. Indeed, the fact that life in prison without
parole foreclosed “the rehabilitative ideal” (as the Court put it) 131 is central
to its holding. Indeed, it is perhaps the theme of the opinion, as well the
basis of some of its more moving passages.
Consider in this regard how the Graham Court treats incapacitation
as one of the legitimate goals of punishment, which is illustrative. 132 Even
here, prior to the Court’s explicit discussion of rehabilitation as a purposes
of punishment, rehabilitation creeps in. Incapacitation is a valid rationale
for punishment, Justice Kennedy writes, but not here, because “[t]o justify
life without parole for juveniles” requires a judgment that the juvenile will
be a danger to society forever, which is to say, a judgment that the juvenile
is incorrigible. 133 Kennedy goes on that a judgment of incorrigibility will
be very difficult to make. It will be hard to decide whether a juvenile’s
crime is the result of “transient immaturity” or the result of “irreparable
corruption.” 134
So far, Kennedy’s point is relatively modest, and for that reason also
vulnerable. The fact that it may be hard to find those who are irreparably
corrupt does not mean that no juveniles might be irreparably corrupt, and
that a legislature might rationally target those who are. At least at this
point, the argument only suggests stricter standards or closer analysis for
Graham, that fact alone – that a punishment may foreclose rehabilitation – does real work
in showing that the punishment is unconstitutional. My question is: why was that work not
done in Roper, or at least hinted at?
129
See supra note 2.
130
See supra note 1.
131
Graham, at 74.
132
Lynn Branham (in conversation) has stressed how rehabilitation plays multiple roles in
Graham: as part of its proportionality analysis, as part of its analysis of the purposes of
punishment, and in its discussion of a case-by-case approach to sentencing. I agree. My
analysis here (as the text says) is illustrative, not exhaustive.
133
Id. at 74.
134
Id. at 68.
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deciding who gets life without parole, a point emphasized by Justice
Roberts in his concurring opinion. 135 We don’t need a categorical ban on
life without parole, just a more carefully targeted limit. Some juveniles
may really be incorrigible, and so we might want to incapacitate them.
But what Kennedy says next in his opinion rules this out. For, he
writes, “[e]ven if a State’s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were
later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence
was still disproportionate because the judgement was made at the outset.” 136
That is to say, even if incapacitation is fully warranted (and so a rational
and just punishment), the state cannot engage in it by imprisoning juveniles
in life without parole. Why? The answer, which becomes clearer in the
Court’s explicit discussion of rehabilitation, is that the state cannot
foreclose the possibility at the outset that the offender could be
rehabilitated. Incapacitation is not an acceptable rationale for punishment
because it rules out the offender ever changing for the better. In short,
rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment trumps incapacitation, even when
incapacitation is justified.
Rehabilitation is the last purpose of punishment Kennedy discusses,
although (as we just saw) shapes the discussion of the purposes of
punishment that went before it. 137 Again, as with incapacitation, a sentence
to life without parole passes a judgment on the juvenile and his “value and
place in society,” viz., that he is “incorrigible” and can never “reenter the
community.” 138 It is cruel to say to a juvenile offender that he is
“irredeemable” and that he will never mature enough or be rehabilitated
enough to earn release. As the Court eloquently puts it later in the opinion,
“[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society,
no hope.” 139 This, the Court says, is cruel and unusual. The Constitution
requires giving juveniles the opportunity to show that they can be
rehabilitated, “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 140
B. Graham’s Two Models of Rehabilitation
Graham’s rhetoric is sweeping, which we might expect from Justice
135

Graham at XX (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id. at 73.
137
Rehabilitation figures in the proportionality analysis, too: life without parole is
disproportionate to the juvenile’s offense precisely because it expresses a judgment of
incorrigibility. See id. (judgment of incorrigibility at the outset is “disproportionate”).
138
Graham, at 74.
139
Id. at 79.
140
Id. at 75.
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Kennedy. But what does the rhetoric mean? 141 What in particular does
Kennedy mean by not giving up on the “rehabilitative ideal”? Two models
of rehabilitation seem to be working in Graham, with one ultimately more
important than the other. Graham occasionally alludes to, and twice makes
explicit, the ideal of rehabilitation as training. But the rhetoric, and the
overall thrust of Graham fit more comfortably within the ideal of
rehabilitation as moral reform.
The initial reference Graham makes to the model of rehabilitation as
training comes in its discussion of the rehabilitative purpose of punishment.
The Court cites an amicus brief noting that those sentenced of life without
parole “are often denied access to vocational training and other
rehabilitative services.” 142 Juveniles, the Court adds, are most in need of
these services. A little later, the court hits the point again: “it is the policy
in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation
programs for those” who are ineligible for parole. 143 In other words, life
without parole means not only no hope of release, but a denial of
opportunities for rehabilitation in the form of vocational and educational
programs. When these passages are combined with idea that juveniles must
be able to have a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain release, the
rehabilitation as training model’s influence is patent: prison is a place where
juveniles, if they work at it and have the right kind of support, can become
fit and productive members of society and so can be released into society.
Denying them these services “reinforces” the judgment that the juvenile is
irredeemable, what Kennedy calls a “perverse consequence.” 144
But if the rehabilitation as training model were the only model the
Court had in mind, then the Court’s opinion, I believe, would have a very
different shape and tenor. It would not just mention that programs should
not be closed off to juveniles, it would positively require those programs be
available to them. After all, it would be cruel to say that juveniles should be
given the hope of release while denying them the tools they need to achieve
that release (in this way, as the Court says in a striking passage, the prison
system comes “complicit” in the denial of opportunity 145). But the Court
does not entirely go this way. Instead, it explicitly leaves it open to the
“State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanism for
compliance” with the Court’s instruction that juveniles must be given a
141

For a philosophical look at Kennedy’s rhetoric of hope see Ristroph, Hope, supra note
23.
142
Id. at 74.
143
Id. at 79.
144
Id.
145
See id. (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of
development.”).
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“meaningful opportunity” to obtain release. “It is for legislatures,” the
Court says, “to determine what rehabilitative techniques are appropriate and
effective.” 146
Note three things about the Court’s phrasing here. First, it is a
matter for the State in particular the legislature, and not the Court, to find
ways to comply with the Court’s mandate. In other words, there is no
particular form or type of specifically rehabilitative “opportunity” that is
required. Second, and more revealingly, the State need in the end only
explore means and mechanisms for compliance. It need not, that is, actually
implement any of these means and mechanisms, at least not yet. Indeed,
one could imagine that legislatures might determine, and even reasonably
determine, that “nothing works,” so that no rehabilitative programs are
offered. 147 Third, and most important, what the Court is referring to is not
means and mechanisms of rehabilitation, at least not directly: the Court is
referring to means and mechanisms of release. This is not the language of a
Court that is requiring states adopt the model of rehabilitation as training.
It implies at most that the inmate must have at least an opportunity to prove
he has matured; this is his “opportunity,” not the opportunity for
educational and vocational programs per se. In fact, the Court’s language
here may just be a long way around to saying that the longest permissible
sentence for juveniles is life in prison with the possibility of parole. 148
If this is all Graham requires, then we might worry about the gap
between Graham’s rehabilitative rhetoric and its remedy; the rhetoric of
rehabilitation as training is mostly hortatory. States post-Graham will have
to give juveniles like Graham an opportunity, eventually, for release. But
then do not have to make it any more possible in reality for juveniles to
rehabilitate themselves and so win release. “Meaningful opportunity for
release” becomes more about the preconditions of release than the
conditions of confinement, and the implementation of Graham becomes
(merely) about specifying those conditions. 149 All the same, states may
146

Id. at 73-74.
Again, Kennedy’s opinion is careful (almost too careful): he rejects the idea that life in
prison without parole for juveniles might lock them out from rehabilitative programs. This
is bad, Kennedy says. But nothing in his opinion holds that states have an obligation, in the
first place, to institute those programs.
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Thus Graham does not lead in any straightforward way to creating a “right to
rehabilitation.” Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile
Justice System, 37 VT. L. REV. 381, 385 (2012) (collecting citations on the “right to
rehabilitative treatment”). See also. Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release
Equals Rehabilitation, 16 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 (2011) (Graham “empowered the
States to formulate appropriate and effective rehabilitative techniques”).
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See Drinan, supra note 13; Sarah French Russell, Review for Release, 89 IND. L. J. 373
(2014) (Graham about conditions for release, not right to rehabilitation).
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make rehabilitative programs available to juveniles, but this is not required
of them. 150 What is required is the possibility of release, not rehabilitation
and not even the possibility of rehabilitation.
Is the rhetoric of rehabilitation in Graham empty then? Not entirely,
and not if we keep in mind that rehabilitation as training is only one
possible mode of the rehabilitative ideal. There is second strain in the
Court’s opinion, one that does not focus so much on rehabilitative programs
that the state has to offer, than on the possibility of the offender himself
undertake his own moral reform. Recall that in the model of rehabilitation
as moral reform that reform is not so much the result of prison vocational or
educational programs; instead, the reform comes about from the
individual’s own reflection and remorse. What the state has to do is hold
out hope for the maturation and moral reform, even if (and perhaps
especially if) it cannot compel it.
Justice Kennedy’s rhetoric echoes the principles of the older reform
model of rehabilitation almost precisely. The state does not have to give
Graham access to any rehabilitative programs (although it should not deny
them to him when he is in prison). Rather, the goal is ultimately Graham’s
rehabilitation of himself. In one passage, Justice Kennedy writes, that
“[m]aturity” – not prison, not training – “can lead to that considered
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and
rehabilitation.” 151 And, in an especially vivid paragraph, Kennedy writes
that with a sentence of life without parole, Terrence Graham has no
meaningful opportunity to obtain release “no matter what he might do to
demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not
representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century
attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.” 152 Training
programs may help Graham at the margins become a more productive
society, but it is only his own reflection and remorse that can lead to his
atonement.
What the rehabilitation as reform model positively prohibits are
punishments that say to the offender he cannot reform. If punishment is to
aim at reform, it cannot at the same time make the “expressive judgment” 153
that a person will never reform and be able to reenter society. In other
words, if the intent behind punishment is that the person reform, the
punishment cannot simultaneously convey the judgment that the person
cannot reform. But this judgment is what (by Kennedy’s light) juvenile life
150

In the language of the Tapia opinion, Graham seems to say that probably a lot of good
can come from rehabilitation as training, but there is no constitutional mandate for it.
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without parole expresses: that the juvenile is incorrigible. 154 Indeed, it is
this disqualifying aspect of life without parole that is the basis of the
opinion’s most eloquent passage: “[l]ife in prison without the possibility of
parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope.” 155 Note what disqualifies the
punishment in the first instance: the judgment that the punishment makes,
viz., that the offender is without hope of reform. The punishment is not
wrong for what it does to the offender, but for what it says to him, at the
outset, about his possibility for moral reform.
This rhetoric matches precisely rhetoric of rehabilitation as moral
reform. As Jean Hampton puts it in her article on punishment as moral
education the state must never “regard any one it punishes as hopeless,
insofar as it is assuming that each of these persons still has the ability to
choose to be moral.” 156 Or consider also Antony Duff’s statement of the
moral reform view as one which believes that “we can never have morally
adequate grounds—nothing could count as morally adequate grounds—for
treating a person as being beyond redemption.” 157 Because life without
parole regards juveniles as “hopeless” and treats them as “beyond
redemption,” it is prohibited as a punishment. It is one thing if a
punishment denies juveniles training. It is quite another thing if it denies
juveniles hope, to “imply that those subject to [life without parole are to be
permanently and irrevocably expelled from ordinary community with their
fellow citizens.” 158
Thus Graham’s basic rehabilitative holding: the State cannot
discourage a person from reforming by how it sentences. And if the state
does not discourage reform, reform may happen, perhaps just by dint of
juveniles growing older and maturing. “Maturity” is another key word in
Graham, and it too fits with the model of rehabilitation as moral reform.
The state cannot make you “mature”; it is process one undergoes, more or
less actively, by slowly taking responsibility for yourself. In fact, too much
interference can end up hindering one’s moral growth.
But now we may have a worry about the logic of this argument and
about the model of rehabilitation as reform more generally. According to
that model, nothing stops reform from happening in prison (through
reflection and maturity) and indeed, one might be reformed in prison and
154
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yet never be released. Moral reform, in other words, is a good in itself,
even if it does not have release as its eventual reward. Indeed, if offenders
reform only for the sake of being released, we may wonder whether this
might corrupt their efforts at moral reform not only by encouraging the
pretense of reform when none has occurred, but more generally by giving
offenders the wrong incentives to reform: offenders should show remorse
because they are remorseful, not because they want to get out of jail.
On purely moral reform grounds, there does not seem to be any
disjunct between remaining in prison and being reformed (nor for that
matter, need there be any disjunct between being sentenced to death and
being morally reformed 159). But again, what is important in Graham may
be less about release per se and more about the message the impossibility of
release sends: the state saying that it will never release you seems to entail
that you will not and cannot be reformed. By the same token, saying that
the state must give you a chance of being released strongly suggests that
you can be morally reformed. What is important is that the state give you
hope, rather than a firm guarantee of release. 160 Some juveniles may not, in
fact, ever be released and so their hopes will remain just that; but they
cannot be denied hope at the outset. Indeed, the judgment at the outset is
the main wrong of life without parole and constitutive of that judgment is
disallowing any meaningful opportunity for release.
That this is a rather constrained vision of rehabilitation can be
shown by the fact that rehabilitation as moral reform is compatible with the
“prison is bad for rehabilitation” that was the principle of Tapia and Pepper.
Tapia and Pepper could be reconciled because they both said that one could
never sentence someone to more prison time because that person needed
more rehabilitation. Prison just couldn’t (reliably) be counted on to
rehabilitate people. Note, though, Justice Kennedy doesn’t require that
prison rehabilitate juveniles. Rehabilitation programs in prison are nice, but
not required by the Constitution. Nor does prison in general have to be a
place where people usually get better. Nothing in Graham entails that
prison is good for rehabilitation, and that juveniles should be incarcerated
because incarceration will rehabilitate them. Graham is not a departure
from Tapia and Graham in the end; it accepts their skepticism about the
desirability of prison as a place for rehabilitation. It only says that a
sentence to prison cannot be one that denies any hope that they will reform.
Whether the odds of reform are high or (more probably) low is in a way
beside the point. The state can’t by its sentencing rule out moral reform and
release; this the model of rehabilitation as reform forbids. The rest, which
159
160

See supra note 128 (death penalty not incompatible with rehabilitation).
Note that the state does not deny hope by failing to provide rehabilitative programs.
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is a lot (which is almost everything), is on the offender. 161
C. Applying Graham and Rehabilitation as Moral Reform
Miller v. Alabama, the follow-up case to Graham that required
individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of homicide did not
extend Graham very far. It did not strike down life without parole for
juveniles altogether, as perhaps the logic of Graham dictated. 162 If states
cannot make the judgment “at the outset” that juveniles convicted of
gruesome and terrible nonhomicide crimes are “incorrigible” and “beyond
redemption” how does this change for homicide crimes? Instead, Graham
focused on the possible disproportion between the culpability of juvenile
murderers and life in prison without parole.
In this regard, Miller is a case about the individualization of
punishments in the (old) retrospective, retributive sense, and not in the
prospective, rehabilitative sense. 163 Youth is relevant in figuring out what
the offender deserves for what he or she did, not because it may be relevant
in predicting what he or she might become. Justice Kagan in Miller says
almost nothing about the possible future rehabilitation of offenders in
Miller. She is not worried about expressing the judgment that some
juveniles will be beyond redemption, because someone of them will be; that
is, some of them will really deserve to be in prison for the rest of their lives,
and die in prison. She is worried, rather, that the state be certain that those
who are sentenced to die in prison will be the right ones. 164
Does Graham then lack any bite, any promise for real change?
Miller suggests that it may and that even extending Graham to categorically
prohibit life in prison without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide is
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Pushed to its limit, the logic of Graham leads to a kind of paradox. Graham says we
have to leave open the possibility of reform in prison. At the same time, prison is a place
where reform is very difficult. I return to this paradox in my conclusion.
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Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012).
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Perhaps not surprisingly, both Tapia and Miller were written by Justice Kagan. Tapia is
hostile to extending punishment for rehabilitation; Miller hardly makes use of
rehabilitation, mentioning it only in passing. Miller at 2468.
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Comparing Graham to Miller suggest a final way in which Graham subscribes to yet a
third rehabilitative ideal, this time, rehabilitation as treatment. Graham’s ultimate
prescription for juveniles is not only an individualized sentence: it is an indefinite sentence
subject to proof of rehabilitation. Of course, the rehabilitation Graham is interested is in
the moral reform of the offender (his maturity, his remorse, and his atonement from
reflection), and to a lesser extent, proof that the juvenile can reenter society as a productive
and contributing member. It is not proof that the offender has been “cured” of his
antisocial “sickness,” as the rehabilitation as treatment model held. Still, Graham says that
it is only through rehabilitation that the juvenile offender can be released. Until then, he or
she must remain in jail indefinitely and possibly until death.
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not in the cards. 165 Those juveniles who kill may indeed be fairly judged to
be incorrigible at the outset, and be denied hope, although this will require
an individualized finding. Nonetheless, we might speculate on some areas
where Graham might have some influence even if (or because)
rehabilitation means “rehabilitation as reform.”
1. Shorter and Lesser Punishments
If Miller suggests that the rehabilitative ideal will not travel all the
way upward to eliminate all punishments that impose life in prison without
parole, there is still a possibility that it might affect some lesser sentences,
including non-prison sentences. These sentences would be ones in which a
judgment was made that the offender would never reform, no matter the
remorse he felt or the efforts at atonement he made. Grahm said that life
without the possibility of parole entailed this judgment, but there may be
other punishments that also imply incorrigibility. Based on Graham, these
cases might also be candidates for cruel and unusual punishment, because
they too would give up the rehabilitative ideal.
One possible extension of Graham (which may hardly seem an
extension at all) is to apply it to sentences that are de facto life sentences.
Graham read very narrowly would apply only to sentences of life without
parole and not to sentences of years (and Justice Alito cautioned that this is
all Graham should have been taken to mean 166). But what of a sentence of
one hundred years without the possibility to parole to a sixteen year old;
isn’t that the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence? Or, to
put it in terms of moral reform: doesn’t such a sentence also make the
judgment that the person is beyond reform? A California court in 2012 was
the first to rule that a sentence that allowed a 16 year old a parole hearing
only after 100 years was unconstitutional, finding that Graham applied to
both “life without parole or equivalent de facto sentences.” 167 Other courts
have followed; some have found even shorter sentences to be de facto life
without parole sentences. 168 How to fix exactly how long is too long,
165

At least, in the short term. The logic of Graham on rehabilitation, I think, leads
inevitably to the conclusion that all life without parole punishments for juveniles are
unacceptable. That Miller does not embrace this conclusion shows that the Court is not
ready to extend Graham’s logic.
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Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”).
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People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (2012).
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Floyd v. State, 87 So.3d 45, 45–47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (eighty-year sentence and
first opportunity for release at age eighty-five); and Adams v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––,
2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. No. 1D11–3225, Aug. 8, 2012) (sixty-year
sentence and first opportunity for release around age seventy-six); but cf. Bunch, 685 F.3d
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however, remains an area of contention among state courts. 169
Another, related extension of Graham involves lifetime punishments
that do not involve incarceration. Consider a juvenile sex offender who is
required to register for the rest of his life and that no showing of
rehabilitation could ever be sufficient to remove the registration
requirement. If sex offender registration is properly considered part of a
punishment, 170 then could a lifetime registration requirement also give up
on the “rehabilitative ideal”? A court in Ohio found that a lifetime
registration requirement did exactly this, although it focused more on how
registries might make it harder for people to find work, or to integrate into
the community. 171 A clearer route might have been how the fact that the
ban could never be lifted, nor matter proof of moral reform, was in fact a
judgment that the offender would never reform, that the state would always
have to keep an eye on him. The problem with emphasizing the practical
difficulties of reintegration is that it could plausibly be said that the original
conviction was the problem, not the registration. 172 Better to hold that the
state could not rule out ex ante the possibility of moral reform by such a
sentence, however difficult it might be in practice. In other words, the
problem on the rehabilitation as reform reading of Graham is not so much
the obstacles to rehabilitation but the judgment the state makes at the outset
that moral reform can never happen. Such an analysis might be extended to
at 546 (declining to apply Graham to consecutive, fixed-term sentences); State v.
Kasic, 228 Ariz. 228, 265 P.3d 410 (App.2011) (same); Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084,
1086–89 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) ( review granted 107 So.3d 405)(same); and Angel v.
Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011) (state statute permitting prisoners at
age sixty or older who have served at least ten years of their sentence to petition for
conditional release provides the “meaningful opportunity for release” required
by Graham ).
169
See People v. Lucero, 2013 WL 1459477, 4 (Colo.App.) (“Defendant argues on appeal
that, statistically, ‘serving 20 years in prison takes 16 years off life expectancy,’ thereby
decreasing his natural life expectancy ‘by about 32 years’ before he becomes eligible for
parole. According to his calculation, his life expectancy is only forty-two years, and
therefore the point at which he obtains his first opportunity for parole exceeds that
expectancy.”).
170
See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (sex offender registry “punishment”
for purposes of ex post facto clause analysis).
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In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012); id. at 527 (“Finally, as to the final penological
goal—rehabilitation—we have already discussed the effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a
statutorily imposed scarlet letter as he embarks on his adult life. ‘Community notification
may particularly hamper the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders because the public stigma
and rejection they suffer will prevent them from developing normal social and
interpersonal skills—the lack of those traits [has] been found to contribute to future sexual
offenses.’”) (citation omitted).
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See, e..g, Doe at 1011 (considering argument that deleterious effects of registry are
attributable not to registry, but to conviction for sex offense).
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other, permanent disabilities offenders might face even after they are
released: bans that prevent ex-felons from voting, for instance. 173
2. Prison Conditions
Above, I said that Graham does not require that states provide
rehabilitative training to juveniles; the most it requires is an opportunity for
release. There is a gap between the requirement of a “meaningful
opportunity” for parole and any possible means to achieve that goal. This
gap is problematic only if we think of rehabilitation as training; it is not as
problematic if we think of rehabilitation as moral reform. Moral reform is
in the end something the offender has to do on his own, by reflection and by
atonement. Moral reform is nothing that a vocational or educational
program can bring him to if does not want to be brought to it. In terms of
actual, positive requirements, Graham and the moral reform model may
allow states to get off the hook to a significant degree.
What rehabilitation as moral reform may require is that prison
conditions not be so degrading and dehumanizing that they also “send a
message” that moral reform is impossible. What Graham prohibited was, at
bottom, the “expressive judgment” by society that a juvenile was
incorrigible. 174 This message is sent by a sentence of life in prison without
parole: it says, no matter how much you change, you are still irredeemable
in society’s eyes. But a life without parole sentence might not be the only
way society might send such a message. Degrading or dehumanizing prison
conditions might also express that judgment; they also might express to the
offender that no matter how much he changes, society will nonetheless treat
him as incorrigible and beyond redemption. Bad conditions, too, can
deprive an offender of hope just as certainly as a lifetime prison sentence
may. Here, we can give a deeper meaning to Justice Kennedy’s statement
that the prison system “itself becomes complicit in the lack [of the
offender’s] development” 175 – not by depriving him of rehabilitative
training, but by removing any possibility that prison is a place where he can
be reformed, and where the judgment of incorrigibility is “reinforced by the
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Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 54, 57 (1974), where the respondents raised the
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prison term.” 176 As one moral reform theorist put it, a punishment cannot
aim at “degrading or brutalizing a person” because this is “not conducive to
moral awakening but only to bitterness and resentment.” 177
In this way, Graham may connect up to litigation against cruel and
unusual prison conditions, and not just to litigation against other cruel and
unusual sentences. 178 Prisoners may not have a constitutional right to
rehabilitation, 179 but they may have a right not to be prevented from ever
achieving moral reform by conditions which treat them as “incorrigible”
and “beyond redemption.” 180 As Alice Ristroph has written, this “negative”
holding of Graham “could lead to greater scrutiny of solitary confinement,
security classifications, and other dimensions of prison conditions that
render a sentence more severe without necessarily extending its duration.”
This is especially true if we treat rehabilitation as on a par with retribution
as a purpose for punishment. 181 For retribution, harsh conditions may be
part of the punishment. 182 But rehabilitation as moral reform may put a
constraint on how harsh conditions can be: they cannot be so harsh that they
in effect judge the offender to be beyond reform, because they make it
impossible that he could ever reform. 183
Here, however, we should be mindful of the Court’s jurisprudence.
In Beard v. Banks, 184 for example, the Court seemed to endorse (or at least
refused to condemn) a prison plan of “rehabilitation through
deprivation,” 185 in which misbehaving prisoners were deprived of
magazines and other reading material. “Any deprivation of something a
prisoner desires,” according to the broader theory, “gives him an added
incentive to improve his behavior.” 186 Such crude efforts at behavior
control come close to themselves being dehumanizing, to say nothing of
176
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154 (2002) (describing conditions in overcrowded juvenile detention centers where
children were “handcuffed to iron pipes for extended periods” and concluding “[i]n short,
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their limited “rehabilitative” potential. And yet this is only the tip of the
iceberg of harsh prison conditions which make surviving, let alone
reforming, in prison barely possible. 187 Indeed, under the guide of
rehabilitation, prison may become harsher rather than more humane. 188 In
the abstract, the ideal of moral reform may prohibit this; practice may be
something entirely different. 189
3. Adults
In Roper, the Court emphasized how different juveniles were from
adults: in terms of their brain development, their susceptibility to influence
by others, and most ambiguously, their lack of a fully formed
“character.” 190 On the one hand, all of these things made juveniles less
culpable for their crimes, a theme that also is present in Graham. 191 On the
other hand, and this is a theme present in Graham but not in Roper, this
state of undevelopedness might make juveniles more and not less capable of
rehabilitation: they are not yet who they will be; they can mature, and by
maturing, show that they are not inevitably what their crime might indicate
them to be. 192 They are better that that, or rather who “they” are is not yet
who they might be over time, and through rehabilitation. By comparison,
adults are who they are and so may be more culpable and by the same token
less capable of future rehabilitation. Adults are to be punished; children are
to be rehabilitated. 193 Juveniles, in the language of Graham, have a greater
“capacity to change.” 194
187
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On either the model of rehabilitation as treatment or rehabilitation as
training, the contrast between adults and children holds. Children can be
more easily treated, perhaps. Their sickness, if that’s what it is, has not yet
taken root. The older a person is, the more it takes to recover and be well.
It may, in fact, be too late to treat some adults. Children are also easier to
educate: their minds are still growing. Not so with adults, who can be
trained, if they can be trained at all, with greater difficulty. They are old
dogs trying to learn new tricks. On the first two models of rehabilitation,
children really are different from adults. In a word, adults are harder to
rehabilitate, if indeed they can be rehabilitated at all. Of course, some
adults will find they can be rehabilitated and some children will resist any
efforts at rehabilitation. But if rehabilitation is treatment or if rehabilitation
is training, the generalization holds for the most part.
It is less clear that the contrast stands if we use the model of
rehabilitation as moral reform, viz., that it will be easier for children to
reform themselves, to reflect, and to show remorse for what they have done
and harder for adults. Couldn’t moral reform be equally possible for both
of them? To be sure, it may be easier for some children and harder for
some adults. But as a generalization, it seems wrong to judge children
always more capable of moral reform and adults always as less capable.
Some kinds of sophisticated moral reform may even be impossible for
children, that is, a certain level of maturity may be necessary even to start
the process of moral reflection. 195 Even a type of moral conversion seems
possible even for the most hardened of adults. More generally,
contemporary moral reform theorists tend to insist that we should not treat
any person “beyond civic redemption.” 196 If this is right, the rehabilitation
as a purpose of punishment cannot be limited to sentences that involve
juveniles. Whether a punishment leaves open the possibility of moral
reform should be a constraint on all punishments: we should not give up on
anybody. Again, what this entails may be very limited, at least in terms of
the sentences it applies to. It may only apply to life in prison without parole
sentences for juveniles or adults, because only that particular sentence
expresses the judgment that the person is irredeemable. 197
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Duff, supra note 78, at 186.
197
See William Berry, More Different Than Death, Less Different Than Life, 71 OHIO ST.
L. J. 1139 (2010). For one court’s rejection of Graham’s application to adults, see
Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 291 (Pa. 2013) (children are different for purposes
of sentencing in Miller and Graham).

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILIATIVE IDEAL

39

V. CONCLUSION
Graham was decided long after the rehabilitative ideal had fallen out
of favor. It had stopped, for the most part, acting as an ideal and became
more of a side consideration to other, more “weighty” purposes of
punishment such as retribution and deterrence. Graham does not, and
cannot, by itself revive the rehabilitative ideal, and I have argued anyway
that Graham’s version of rehabilitation is rather modest. It does not entail
any positive obligation on the state’s part to rehabilitate the offender; it does
not mandate any vocational or educational programs. It was decided
against a backdrop of legislative and judicial hostility to the idea of prison
as a place for rehabilitation, and it does not directly repudiate that hostility.
Rather, it only says that society cannot pass the judgment that people will
not rehabilitation him or herself in prison. It has to hold out the hope, at
least for juveniles, that they will be able to reform themselves while they
are in prison.
But Graham has, if only by the centrality of the concept of
rehabilitation in its holding, put rehabilitation back on the agenda. It was, at
the least, a relatively surprising development, although it remains to be seen
what actual impact its emphasis on the hope of rehabilitation will have.
There are some stirrings in the lower courts, but they are just that: stirrings.
Nor has the decision led much in the way of sustained academic reflection
on the “rehabilitative ideal.” 198 Moreover, we should not, I think, dispense
with skepticism about the two problems that led many to discard the
rehabilitative ideal. Identifying rehabilitation as reform is one thing, and a
necessary step; but endorsing it is quite another thing.
First, we should consider whether rehabilitation as moral reform is a
worthy ideal in itself. Should the state aim to have offender pursue
remorse, reflection and atonement? Is this even a valid goal for a liberal
state? 199 Or should the state only imprison with a view towards deterring
criminals and protecting society. 200 Worries about manipulating offenders,
to get them to believe the right things, plagued the model of rehabilitation
as treatment. Similar worries might be raised about rehabilitation as moral
reform, which displays an intense interest in molding the attitudes,
emotions, and beliefs of the offender; in short, in shaping the offender’s
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soul. 201 Moral reform is something we might take up qua members of a
religious community or a family; it may be less appropriate as a goal that
the state pursues.
Second, and perhaps more profoundly, we might still worry whether
prison can work as a place for rehabilitation at all. Rehabilitation as reform
removes the burden on the state to supply offenders with rehabilitative
services; at least, it does not mandate them, although if they are present, the
state cannot deny them to juveniles. I have suggested that rehabilitation as
moral reform also should not condone brutalizing and degrading prison
conditions: these, too, can express a judgment that an offender is
“irredeemable.” But is even this sufficient? Tapia, especially, displayed a
profound skepticism--both legislative and judicial-- that prison could be at
all compatible with rehabilitation.202 Prison was not to be used for
rehabilitation, period. Graham, by contrast, seems to depend on the idea
that at least rehabilitation is generally possible in prison. This is not
inconsistent with thinking prison is not the best place for reform, but it is in
some tension with it.
Suppose that we have good reason to doubt that even the best prison
could be a place for rehabilitation as moral reform; suppose we even
thought that most of the time prison positively hinders a person’s project of
moral reform. We would then be simply repudiating the vision of those
who founded the penitentiary, and who thought that confinement and
meditation could be a path to moral development and maturity, and who
thought more generally that prison and punishment could cause one to
reform. If we depart with the vision of prison as a place for moral reform,
then we might think that the best thing for juveniles (and for everybody) is
to find ways to keep them out of prison altogether except when this was
needed to protect society. Giving up on this might mean giving up on the
hope of moral reform in prison. But if prison is a bad place for reform in
general, that was a false hope anyway. Deciding whether to extend Graham
means, first, deciding whether we should hold out that hope.
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